07.20.08
Posted in Viewpoint at 1:19 am by alanyuter
When one vows and lies, one not only is saying a falsehood, one profanes one’s speech as a religious object of concern. Truth telling is a fundamental Jewish value. The Torah blessing affirms that we, all of us, i.e., all Israel, were given a Torah that is true.
For many religiously affiliating Jews, Judaism represents the “fear of people” and not the “fear of God.” Looking good is essential to being “accepted.” Being good is not quite as necessary and often in conflict with our passions. Some rabbis believe that it is permissible to lie to Jews to trick them into being more observant. This “observance,” however, is defined by conventional and community standards, and not by Torah standards.
In Judaism’s canonical statement, the oral law, we find the one occasion when lying is appropriate, and when one must not only tell the truth, but also the pains to which one must go in order to be a truth teller.
Exodus 23:7 teaches not one but three religious truths:
A. You must distance oneself from falsehood
B. The innocent and the justified one may not kill
C. God will not justify the wicked
The Torah is teaching three statements, each of which leads to the following as a list which embodies a programmatic ideology. It is not sufficient to tell the truth; one must distance oneself from falsehood. It is not sufficient to be technically and syntactically correct in what one says when one knows that one is being duplicitous, disingenuous, and misleading. Such falsehoods have consequences; they can lead to the oppression of the innocent and the conviction of the justified. Therefore, the Ultimate Judge reminds humankind to be just to human beings because there is a Judge and there is a judgment
Maimonides understands Scripture to refer to the judge who must rule rightly, to avoid hearing the litigants separately and privately, not in the presence of one without the other [ex parte] being present. By hearing one side without the other, argues Maimonides,
[Book of Commandments, Negative Commands 281] one is not being fair and therefore not truthful. Giving and receiving slander also violates this law.
The one exception to the rule regarding falsehood is found in bKetubot 17a. One is invited to a wedding and has to say some nice compliment to the bride. However, the bride is, by every estimate, something less than a “knock out.” If the homemaker is homely, what should the good guest say? Should he “tell it like it is,” or should he fib and beg God for forgiveness? The House of Shammai, the stern Galilean patrician school, says we should “tell it like it is,” while the socially astute plebian, Hillel’s House, counseled generosity and requires the apparently false formula, “the bride is nice looking and pious.” Incredulously, the Shammaites protest, “how may you Hillelites refer to the bride as attractive, being she is either lame or blind?” Does the Torah not command [amara in Arabic and Aramaic and amar in Hebrew often refers to command. The Toraitic laimore is always followed by an imperative!] [not only do not lie but] distance yourself from falsehood?”
For Hillel, the groom thinks that the bride is beautiful. And since this beauty is relative, in the eyes of the beholder, in this case, when no one loses with the falsehood, social good will must prevail.
The Talmud [bShavuot 30b-31a] lists fourteen cases, double heptads of instances, where the verse requiring distancing oneself from falsehood must be applied. The common thread of these passages is instructive.
- The judge may not act as a defense attorney [advocate] [the judge must not only be non-partisan, the judge must be fanatically impartial and judge the case on the merits of the facts, not on the basis of social, familial, business, or ideological interests.
- The judge may not place an uncouth student in his presence [one might err and think the student is worthy of innocence by association]
- A judge who knows that a person is a thief, who is not eligible to be a witness, or a witness who knows that the other “witness” is indeed a thief and is therefore not eligible to be a witness, may not join with them accepting them as witnesses
- A judge who realizes that the witnesses are deceitful may not go through the motions and argue that the testimony must be accepted, it is not my responsibility. God’s Torah requires that the Judge intervene and insure justice
- A student judge [apprentice] may not be silent when realizing that the poor is innocent and the wealthy litigant is guilty. [No favors for station in Jewish law!]
- A student sees the teacher/rabbi making an error, may not wait until the case is completed and show off his erudition, but must announcement what he believes to be the truth. [Torah is not a means to social status, but living by defining God’s truth]
- The dicey case where the teacher, an otherwise honest man, tells his student to appear with him as if he were a second witness to give a false impression, so that he might recover a loss. [The teacher asks an improper request because the student is asked to serve the teacher by giving a false impression. The Jew’s first loyalty is to God].
- The anonymous Aramaic insertion defines this case that the “word” of falsehood is not all that is to be avoided. Even the misleading non-verbal gesture that involves no active act of falsehood is forbidden precisely because it is misleading
- A plaintiff may not lie and overstate his claim realizing that the court will give him half of his claim. This is similar to overstating one’s insurance losses or understating one’s obligations to the Internal Revenue Service.
- If one denies owing money in court but will admit to the dept out of court, just to avoid being asked to swear on other issues, one is still uttering a self-serving falsehood.
- Three people to whom money is owed may not function as a judge and two witnesses. Even if they are telling the truth, the court is stacked and a stacked court is a false court.
- If two litigants appear in court, one dressed in rags and the other in a custom made navy blue three piece pin striped suit with a smartly matching silk tie accompanied by a shiny, bejeweled tie clip [the Talmud refers to a stole or cape] the rich fellow must either dress the pauper in decent clothes or he must dress himself down to the style of the litigant. Consider coming to the court of the Beis Din of Baltimore, one in a navy blue three peace pin striped suit with a silk tie and a silk funeral home skull cap, and another with a wide brimmed black fedora, a matching black caftan, and an open white shirt with no tie at all, lest the pious man make the sign of the cross about his neck. What do you think that the Beis Din of Baltimore, all of whose rabbis are Haredi, would rule in this case? In the words of the late comedian, Jackie Gleason, hmmmnnnnn.
- The court/judges may not hear a case from one litigant without the opposition having been present. [The appearance of partiality violates the impartiality principle of telling the truth.]
- The litigant may not adjust his narrative with the judge before his opposition appears.
The Jewish legal rules require a rule of law, principle, honesty, and justice. This principle not only applies to the podium of the study hall, but to the real life realities of the real world. Insiders do not get preference because God says so. There are no unwritten rules that happen to insure that the politically correct side wins.
We remind Jewish judges that God is watching us, and we do not distinguish between justice and “just us.” Falsehood that is self-serving is always forbidden. The American Department of Justice must apply the law equally, to Democrats and Republicans alike.
A Jewish law that is enforced fairly will win the good faith of faithful Jews. A Jewish “law” that is applied with bias and partiality, whereby personal biases are incorrectly labeled Masora/Tradition, denies the God who demands justice and truth of us. While it is socially correct to look good, the Torah of truth demands that we be good
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07.15.08
Posted in D'var Torah, Viewpoint at 1:23 am by alanyuter
When Moses was asked to erect the lamp stand, an image was given to him as a template. When we want to see the image of the priestly person of piety, we are given the personhood of Pinehas.
Pinehas was described in rabbinic literature as a vigilante, [San 82a] to be respected for his commitment but whose example, of apparently taking the law into his own hand, ought not to be copied. The rabbis wanted to discourage misplaced passion, and read the Pinehas incident as an ethical ideal but not as a moral precedent. We recall the historical reality of the Mishnaic rabbis, whereby in 70 C, Rabbi Yohanan b. Zakkai was removed from the besieged and soon to be destroyed Jerusalem and who reconstituted the rabbinic movement at Jamnia. In this historical context of military impotency in the face of Roman legions, the Pinehas policy has shown to be disastrous.
To plumb the depths of the Pinehas incident, we [a] review what Pinehas did, [b] what the implicit meaning of his action, and [c] the significance of that implicit meaning for the religious life of modern Orthodox Jews.
I. What Pinehas did
When the Israelites were in the location of Baal Peor, the local fertility cult site, the anticipation of sexual immortality compromised the absolute fidelity to God that Torah religion requires. Recalling that Israel is blessed from the time of Abraham, Balaam was unable to curse Israel because God, the source of blessing, decreed a blessing. For Balaam’s paganism, human beings are able to manipulate the gods, who are spirits of human invention and projection. Balaam came to realize that the God of Israel is real, and only if Israel displeases God—through sexual and theological infidelity—will evil befall Israel.
Scripture teaches that Israel was nitsmad to Baal Peor, or attached and sticking to this deity whose command and demand was physical pleasure and moral license. When told to act immorally, the Israelites acted as if to proclaim, “thy will be done.” This act, or series of acts, one not a one night stand or a momentary fling; it was an affair, a relationship, and an alternative, competing, and demoralizing pattern of acting, thinking, and feeling. Moses is commanded by God that the leaders of Israel who had sinned, violating God’s law and their public mandate to be moral models, are to be killed. Note well that it is God Who issues the command for their execution. In Israelite morality, leadership is not a source of license, but a model for morality.
God is real and takes His relationship with Israel seriously. Adultery, idolatry and murder are the three unnecessary and therefore unforgivable sins. And to keep Israel in God’s camp, Israel must keep its own camp clean. Since some leaders were asked to execute their peers, their friends, they were actually being asked to make a choice that was controversial, inconvenient, politically incorrect, and socially intolerant. When the lower classes do wrong, it is sin; when the elite are “naughty,” it is not described as sin, but only “inappropriate.” Sinning for conventional people is the stigma assigned to little people.
The elite wept because they were inept. Important people became impotent people.
The Numbers narratives continue to remind the Israelite reader that right resides in one’s conscience, and not on a social register. God cares nothing for your background, but greatly about your forward moral progress.
Seeing the inaction of the Israelite leadership, which was hesitant to obey God’ command, Pinehas stood in the breach and did what other leaders could have and should have done. Pinehas was not a vigilante, but he want vigilant. He kills Kozbi and Zimri, the twosome whose “social indiscretion” angered God.
II. The meaning of Pinehas’s deed
For most people, cult is part of culture. It represents how we present ourselves and justify ourselves in everyday life. We assign meaning of our invention to justify our intention, creating a culture not of covenant but of convention. We construct and reconstruct our lives justifying ourselves but never sanctifying ourselves.
Pinehas took God’s command seriously. There is a right and wrong. Just like the flood at the Noah narrative teaches, an act that is bad does not become good because humankind agrees to tolerate. A Jewish ritual act called a custom, an act of human invention, does not become either valid or legitimate just because we agree that the act is a “good thing to do.” TV teaches that adultery is acceptable but theft is terrible. According to Torah, adultery is a more serious sin than theft, as is idolatry. If the act of custom violates Torah law, it is wrong. Conventional religion is mimicry, which is a mockery. We solicit the approval of peers while not peering into ourselves. The Torah disallows homosexuality. It was a common Greek practice. It was accepted by some. But God did not accept the practice.
Pinehas is the religious hero because when the people replaced covenant before convention, Pinehas placed God first in the order of priority. The plague stopped after Pinehas killed the offending couple.
In God’s religion, called Torah, there are no privileged elites; a committee that rewrites God’s law is a synod of sinners, whether they wear black fedoras or ministerial miters.
III. Pinehas in our Time
Pinehas reminds us that religion is serious. Convention is about looking good; Torah is about doing and being good. If we do not believe in false gods, ghosts, or spirits, we do not ask the dead to pray for us. We visit graves to remember our ancestors, not to talk to them. If we take the words “bless us in peace angels of peace” on Friday night literally, we are engaging in idolatry. To keep the religious peace, one must stand in the breach against wrongdoing. When the late Abraham Heschel marched at Selma, he taught that religion is not about the rite of ritual but the right that opposes wrong. He took initiative to do good, not to be confused with the urge to self promote
The Israelite priest has many roles. At the sacrifices, he represents Israel to God.
On one hand, the priest dirties himself to cleanse others, as in the red cow rite, he also goes out to battle as a military chaplain and is a teacher of Torah. He is both God’s representative and humanity’s servant. His blessing is peace predicated upon power.
By giving Israel power, Israel insures peace. The priest reminds Israel that it is not an ethnic cousin’s club, but a brotherhood constituted for bring God on earth. Pinehas reminds us that we cannot take our rights and selves seriously unless we take God seriously as well.
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07.06.08
Posted in Viewpoint at 1:53 am by alanyuter
[Editor’s Note: An earlier critique was submitted to an article written on this site. The reply to the critique was never published because it was withdrawn at the request of the critic. Since the discussion remains interesting to the Editor, the Editor has published the reply below.]
In response to the learned critique of [name omitted by Editor], the following comments are in order.
- Hebrew has a grammatical rule system called masorah. Raabad or Raavad could be justified. And alef does not yield a Rayvid dipthong. If one can justify “Rayvid” linguistically, I would be happy to reconsider my reading. That there are discrepancies in Torah masoretic pointing, I readily concede. But there is no serious justification for the “Rayvid reading other than some Jews say it.
- The Written Torah and Targum Unqolos come with articulation traditions that can be documents, albeit with variants. The fact that variants exist do not excuse all variants that we, in error, due to Yiddish, invent.
- I actually agree that Rabbi Joseph Colon is a reformer. I believe, like Rav Halivni, that R. Zacharias Frankel incorrectly confused description as legitimate prescription. Now, I believe that R. Frankel was shogeg, in error. I also believe that R. Frankel was not an evil person, and was regarded as a great Rav by many—if not S. R. Hirsch, in the Traditional camp. We recall that Hirsch insulted R. Franekel, Maimonides, as well as the Zohar, [which may to our view be subject to review like Maimonides] but because of politics Orthodox culture gave Hirsch a pass, which to my mind is not appropriate. R. Colon believed that a custom in ritual overrides law. This sounds strongly similar to Conservative Judaism and therefore demure that R. Colon is the equal of Maimonides. If a custom can violate a law of the Talmud, what is core Judaism altogether.
- [name omitted by Editor] cites Prof. Haym Soloveitchik with the claim that Tosafot speaks in the name of many rabbis and Maimonides, but one. That argument works in a bet din. The fact that views of a school of thought produces opinions we can document only addresses the availability of the document, not the merits of the case. Are we to believe in the sanctity of Christian Scripture and not the Mishnah because that is the belief of most human beings in the West? [See Ahad Haam, Hatsi Nehama]
- Midrashim of the sages, in plenum, are authorized to subvert the philological text of the canon; post-Talmudic rabbis are not. If one believes that the right reverend rabbis may legitimately subvert canonical texts we must then ask:
- Where do they and not others derive this “authority”?
- What is the hermeneutic that is to be applied? If the claim is that the hermeneutic is esoteric, the Torah not being in Heaven, the claimant is a heretic; if the claim is that there is indeed a hermeneutic, how may it be tested for legitimate application?
- The court of Rabina and Rab Ashi, the end of Horaah, was accepted by all Orthodox Israel. We do not allow rabbis, Orthodox or Reform, to reform the Tradition. Torah Judaism is not what Jews happen to do. This religion is called “Reconstructionism.” Torah Judaism, what Rabbi Jacob Neusner calls “the Judaism of the Dual Toraah, is what the law prescribes and as a map describes. No view is dismissed a priori, and no view is privileged because this or that rabbi is so holy that the view “must” be right. Academic Orthodox Jewish scholars try to define what the canon says and not leave Torah interpretation to those with alternative agendae.
- It is the reasoning of the argument and not the charisma of the person that determines authentically correct thought and behavior. We recall that R. Elijah b. Solomon Kramer, the Gaon of Vilna, used philology in search of Torah truth. Ha-Gerash Lieberman used the same method. The fact that Prof. Haym Soloveitchik feels that the numbers of rabbis who feel a certain way may obviate truth claims is not, for our community, relevant. Rav Halivni speaks of yosher daat, integrity, and emuna tserufa, refined faith. I do not have faith in the consensus of the uninformed, or in a Judaism in which the community consensus based on culture inertia is improperly reified into the will of God, and in which unreflective habit becomes the essence of what is misconstrued as “Tradition.”
- We recall Lamentations, “our fathers sinned and are no more, and we bear the burden of their wrongs.” Critical method, or reasoned interpretation, must be applied to uncover authentic tradition. This quest is not our right, it is our mandate.
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06.29.08
Posted in Viewpoint at 1:13 pm by alanyuter
Avot 2:3
Rabban Gammaliel taught that
A. one must be careful when dealing with the government
B. because the government shows favor to others only when it is in the interest of the government to do so
C. [for example]
a. The government will appear as friendly when it is beneficial
b. And will not be helpful when times are difficult.
The Nasi, Rabban Gammaliel, stood at the head of the Jewish polity, with integrity but without independence, with eyes open but without naïveté, without allusion regarding his the real limits of his power and with a realistic assessment how Israel was to survive when bereft of political sovereignty. He taught above [2:2] that one should be accomplished in both Torah and the realities of life, and here we are taught how to apply that reality.
The government of Rome wants taxes and the good life for its elite. They are exploiters and conquerors. Morality is for the pagan ultimately about power and privilege. The citizen gets powers in theory, but powers are not necessarily taken seriously. Since without order, there is no law, the government is respected for the good that it can do.
But do not be seduced with sweet words; do not think that for a blink you will be betrayed. Government is a means to control and exploit; the right to rule is a right to steal. Occasionally, government might act uprightly. Accidents happen!
Note the logic of the Mishnah. First, a statement: “be careful when dealing with the government.” The reason why care is necessary is because the government is made in order to partake of the possessions of the people, paid for by the people, and in place for fleecing the people. The “government” description stands in sharp contrast to the Jewish ethical rule, which [2:1] brings honor to God the King and to Israel, God’s subjects.
Even if we are politically unfree, our minds and hearts remain free if we keep our moral, political, and practical compass in order.
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06.23.08
Posted in D'var Torah, Viewpoint at 1:27 am by alanyuter
To properly appreciate the Korah narrative, we must first summarize other narratives that teach, with the Korah narrative, the composite lesson for authentic and legitimate Torah authority. After the narratives of Leviticus and Numbers are complete, the values encapsulated in these narratives are later to be codified in the first law code to be public, accessible, and socially neutral in world history, Deuteronomy.
The Korah narrative is reported after the reader learns that religious intuition is not a sufficient source of God’s will. After offering an improper cult fire, Nadab and Abihu are killed for wrongly adding a rite to Torah. Torah is no less than the inerrant command of God and may not be reduced to the insight, intuition, or best intention of people, however expert, well intentioned, or highly placed. Only the Sanhedrin, sitting in plenum, is authorized by God to fill in the penumbra of Torah, the so-called gaps in the law.
After Eldad and Medad are discovered to be prophesying in the camp, Joshua, Moses’ squire, wants them to be arrested. After all, they are illegitimately encroaching upon his mentor’s turf, charisma, authority, and office. According to Joshua the novice, greatness resides in the office and office holder; the rest of the community must modestly accept their subservient station. For Moses, God’s servant, talent is not to be stifled, truth may not be suppressed, and inspiration may not be institutionalized. Here, Joshua learns that Torah authority resides in the Torah principle, not in the office or the officer. Right is determined by what one does and not by whom one happens to be.
Once this lesson, that religious right is defined by Torah and not by institutions, is internalized by Joshua, he is able to be, with Caleb, a theologically correct minority of two with the courage to withstand overwhelming but religiously wrong majority of ten when he opposed the ten spies who claimed that the Promised Land could not be conquered. Even though the ten evil spies were great men of pedigree and standing, they disregarded God and were, from Torah’s perspective, evil. Institutions in Torah are instruments of right and not the embodiment of right. To this end, God allowed the Holy Temple to be destroyed twice to teach this lesson to the Jewish people.
Korah is the subversive virtuoso who has mastered the vocabulary of the religious culture. Like some within our synagogues who use “old fashioned Hebrew” to validate their “traditional” presentation of themselves by mispronouncing Hebrew fluently, Korah employs religious diction flawlessly, like contemporary Jews who execute religious rituals and Jewish dance steps flawlessly. He looks, speaks, and sounds like the quintessential insider. His fluency exudes expertise, his confidence kindles consent, and his message massages and numbs the minds of his listeners. And when Korah confronts Moses, the latter falls on his face. The Korah-Moses confrontation anticipates the formulation of H.L.A. Hart that a legal system requires a “rule of recognition” whereby the validity of a claim may be tested. This confrontation is really between the Divine will and human pretender, the public law and the charismatic intuition, and the force of might and the morality of right.
The simple Jew cannot easily distinguish between Korah and Moses with both of them claiming to be the authentic messenger of God. Korah is the better speaker, he possesses greater charisma, and most critically, he tells his audience what he intuits that they would like to hear. But Korah, who unlike Moses is both self-appointed and a liar, issues the challenge, “why did you lift yourselves above God’s congregation?” Moses was given the appointment, which he did not really want and certainly neither sought nor usurped. Aaron was appointed by God to be Moses’ aid and, later, the first of the priests. At Sinai, the people appointed Moses to be their intermediary between themselves and God. Korah’s rebellion was not really a “common sense” rejection of Torah as is popularly claimed; it was a devious, subversive, self-appointed denial of God as Creator, moral compass, and ultimate reality. For Korah, God-talk is the conventional discourse that dupes the devoted. God did indeed appoint Moses and Aaron, and Korah is the usurper. Hence, the test of legitimacy, fire pan flame manipulation, alludes to the mistake made earlier by Nadab and Abihu, who sinned by not taking God’s word seriously at face value. Torah religion is not invented by humans, it is commanded by God. Sanctity is a consequence of commandments, not custom or costume. If conventions become “holy,” society becomes enslaved by the institutions that sanctify of the officers who control the office.
Korah self-appoints, applies self-serving rhetoric, validates his constituency, and is the ritual virtuoso who his bereft of moral virtue. Before the Torah document is given before Moses dies, a miracle validating Moses’ commission must occur. After the Torah is given as a readable document, Korah types may judged on the basis of the demerits of their case. We find people today who are called rabbis, who appoint themselves as authority persons. They rule from the gut, with divinely inspired intuition. They have the right to make rules because their audiences are fools. They need not demonstrate their views, and other Jews, even rabbis in communities; do not have the right to an opinion. Art Scroll editor R. Noson Scherman declares that we may say nothing negative about the people taken to be regarded great rabbis. Originally, Orthodox ordination originally testified to one’s competency to make a reasonable ruling. This canonical principle of Jewish law has now been reformed. Rabbis are policemen, or enforcers, not poseqim, or decisors.
For Korah type people it is evil speech to complain about them, when they are in power. But Korah type people will stoop to any depth to raise themselves to power and will defame, delegitimate and deny the bona fides of those whom they deign to displace and replace. Moses made a final outreach gesture to Korah, who refused dialogue. Rabbis who refuse dialogue in our time on the grounds that “one may not speak to the unbeliever” are really liars, like Korah. If it were not permitted to dialogue with non-believers, how do we justify outreach to the outsiders to Torah? Korah’s compatriots cannot tolerate want peer review. Since they speak for God, and they say so themselves so eloquently, they are not subject to review. Review by them of others is kosher; review of them by others is disrespectful, heretical, treasonous, and heretical.
Although a virtuoso in the use of religious language, the atheistic ego bleeds through Korah’s complaint. If Korah believes in God, the god in whom he believes is himself. He speaks of spirituality. But instead of being filled with spirit, he is over filled with himself.
The greatness of Moses leadership was his modesty. His was a rule of law and value, and not the rule of the religious misleader.
The Korah narrative reminds Israel that the Torah value and not the Torah person is the source of right. Institutions are religious instruments and not moral ends. It is not sufficient to identify Korah, the pretender to Torah; one must muster the moral courage to resist Korah, with his institutional seat of power, constituency control, and misuse of power. It takes courage to be modern and Orthodox.
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